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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AGNES LUNDBERG, 
, 
Plaintiff and Appe.lZant, 
-vs.-
LEGRAND P. BACKMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 8896 
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the 
Record. The parties 'vill he referred to as they were in 
the Trial Court.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal frmn an order granting defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. 
Defendant is a practicing attorney in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and a member of the law firm of Backman, Back-
man & Clark. Plaintiff employed defendant as her attor-
ney in the defense of an action filed in the Third Judicial 
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District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, entitled "Pearl J. Herridge, et al. vs. Agnes Lund-
berg, File X o. 100963." Plaintiff instituted the case at 
bar to recover dmnages for the negligent and unskillful 
1nanner in which defendant performed his services in the 
defense of said quiet title action. 
For a proper staten1ent of facts in this case it is 
necessary to set forth the background of the quiet title 
action. 
The quiet title action concerned the real property 
located at 1215 South 8th East Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Plain tiff believed that she was the owner of the 
property by virtue of a warranty deed from her mother 
and plaintiffs in the quiet title action claimed a two-thirds 
interest in the property by virtue of a decree of distri-
bution in their father's estate. 
The plaintiffs in the quiet title action were the heirs 
of Ernest J. Herridge who had been 1narried to the 
nwther of the plaintiff in the case at bar. ~Ir. and :Mrs. 
1-ierridge had purchased the property located at 1215 
South 8th East and the title thereto was taken in their 
nmnes as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. 
The controversy arose concerning the rights of the par-
ties to the property and this n1atter also concerned the 
defendant LeGrand P. Backlnan. 
Defendant Back1nan was the attorney for ~Ir. and 
~[rs. I-Ierridge and prior to the purchase of the property 
referred to above had smneone in his office prepare a 
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joint will for them. The will set forth that the parties 
had jointly purchased other real property in Salt Lake 
and each owned an undivided one-half interest therein. 
The will further provided that upon the death of either 
the one-half interest of each should be divided one-third 
to the surviving spouse and two-thirds to their surviving 
children by previous marriages. At the time of the execu-
tion of the will Mrs. Herridge had five children, including 
the plaintiff herein, and Mr. Herridge had three children, 
who were later to be the plaintiffs in the quiet title action. 
After the execution of the will the parties sold the 
real property referred to in said will and a few years 
later purchased the property located at 1215 South 8th 
East, taking title as joint tenants. Mr. and Mrs. Herridge 
remained in possession of the property at 1215 South 8th 
East until the death of Mr. Herridge in 1940. 
Defendant Backman represented Mrs. Herridge who 
was the executrix of her husband's estate and the joint 
will was admitted to probate. In that proceeding the 
home at 1215 South 8th East Street, which was held in 
joint tenancy, was erroneously included as an asset in the 
estate and \vas distributed one-third to the widow and 
two-thirds to the three surviving children of Mr. Her-
ridge. 
Mrs. Herridge continued living alone in the home 
until plaintiff herein and her family moved in with her. 
Defendant Backman continued representing plaintiff's 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
mother and had numerous consultations with her pertain-
ing to her affairs and prepared a will wherein the prop-
erty located at 1215 South 8th East was set forth as be-
longing to her personally. On July 12, 1950, defendant 
Backman, after consultation with plaintiff and plaintiff's 
mother, prepared a warranty deed wherein the said prop-
erty was conveyed to the plaintiff herein but reserved a 
life estate in plaintiff's mother. Defendant Backman ad-
vised plaintiff and her mother that upon the death of 
Mrs. Herridge the title to the property would revert to 
plaintiff and there would be no need to have any will 
or probate. Defendant Backman recorded the deed in 
the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County 
on the 13th day of July, 1950. 
Plaintiff continued residing in the home and after 
the death of her n1other in 1953, and upon the advice of 
defendant Backman she recorded a death certificate and 
was informed by defendant Backman that title to the 
property was then vested in her. 
Plaintiff 1nade certain improvements thereon and 
was not aware of the clain1ed interest of the heirs of her 
stepfather until she received a letter from one of the 
heirs and their attorney demanding a partition of the 
property. Upon receipt of both letters plaintiff immedi-
ately consulted with defendant Backman and was assured 
by him that she was the sole owner of the property and 
that the claim of the said heirs was unfounded. Defend-
ant also advised plaintiff not to atten1pt any settlement 
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of the matter or admit the interest of the heirs and, there-
after, on January 23, 1954, suit was instituted against 
plaintiff herein to quiet title to the said property. 
The pleadings of the quiet title action are included 
in the record now on appeal. The pleadings disclose that 
the clairn of the plaintiff heirs was based upon the inter-
est in the property which was distributed by the decree 
of distribution in the estate of Ernest J. Herridge. The 
defense to the action and the basis for the counterclairn 
filed therein was predicated upon the theory that plaintiff 
herein was the sole owner of the property by virtue of the 
warranty deed executed by her mother who was the 
owner of the property. 
Trial was held and a judgment was entered in favor 
of the plaintiff heirs and quieted their title to a two-
thirds interest in the property and a one-third interest 
in the defendant, the plaintiff herein. The judgment fur-
ther assessed the plaintiff herein reasonable rental value 
from the 1st day of February 1953 to the date of trial. 
A motion for a new trial was filed on behalf of the defend-
ant, the plaintiff herein, which was dismissed as not 
being timely filed. The pleadings further reveal that 
the defendant herein filed a withdrawal as counsel on 
January 24, 1955. 
The action at bar was filed to recover damages for 
defendant's negligence in handling the defense of the 
action and for failure to prepare an appeal from the 
judgment. The defendant Backman did not file an 
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answer to plaintiff's complaint, but did file a motion for 
summary judgment with a supporting affidavit. Plain-
tiff filed a counter-affidavit which was confined to an-
swering the matters raised in the affidavit of defendant, 
and did not set forth any additional matters. Argument 
was held before the trial court and defendant's motion 
was granted and this appeal is from the granting of said 
motion. 
Before commencing with the arguments I personally 
would like to state that I was employed by the Commis-
sion of the Utah State Bar Association to advise the 
plaintiff in the matter. 'That in preparing the complaint 
now under consideration, I felt that a fair question 'vas 
presented by the pleadings and I wish to assure this court 
that the action was not filed for any reason other than 
doing justice between the parties. I am acquainted with 
Mr. Backman and his reputation before the bench and bar 
of the State, and I would not intentionally do anything 
to abuse that reputation. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED DPOX 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PREP-
ARATION OF THE TRIAL OF THE CASE. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING 
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TO APPEAL THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL. 
The rule is clear that in ruling on a motion for sum-
mary judgment the court's function is to determine 
whether a genuine issue exists and if it does, then the 
motion for summary judgment should be denied. This 
rule has been stated by this Court in numerous cases. 
Young, et al. v. Felornia, et al., 244 P. 2d 862; 121 
U. 646, at page 648 it is stated: 
"In respect to a summary judgment Rule 56 
(c), U.R.C.P. provides: 
'The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadingl!l, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.' 
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact, the motion 
should be denied. " 
Morris v .Farnsworth Motel, 259 P. 2d 297-298: 
"Under such circumstances, the party against 
whom the summary judgment is granted, is en-
titled to the benefit of having the court consider 
all of the facts presented, and every inference 
fairly arising therefrom in the light most favor-
able to him; which we do in reviewing the inci-
dent." 
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In Holland v. Columb~a Iron Mining Co., 293 Pac. 
700; 4 U. 2d 303, the following is stated in the concurring 
opinion of Justice Crockett, at page 310 : 
"It is true, indeed, that a summary judgment 
is a drastic remedy which the courts are, and 
should be reluctant to use. Yet it does have a 
salutary purpose in the administration of justice 
in not requiring the time, trouble and expense of 
trial, when the best showing the plaintiff can 
possibly claim would not entitle him to a judgment. 
"Viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff does not mean that the court 
should pick out all of the aspects thereof favorable 
to supporting plaintiff's claim and ignore those 
that indicate to the contrary. It means that the 
court surveys the whole picture, takes into con-
sideration facts and inferences therefrom tending 
to favor the plaintiff's position and also considers 
other facts appearing which n1ust be accepted as 
a matter of law, and weighs the whole matter 
against the background of legal precepts bearing 
on the problem. If ·when so viewed, reasonable 
1ninds could make findings that would make out 
a cause of action in accordance with the plaintiff'::; 
claims, summary judg1nent should not be granted; 
on the other hand, if it appears to the court that 
reasonable 1ninds rould not make findings which 
would establish a rause of action for the plain-
tiff, then the sununary judg1nent is proper." 
Plaintiff contends that in reYiewing this 1natter in 
the light n1ost favorable to plaintiff this Court will find 
that there are genuine issues of fact presented and 
reasonable 1ninds could find defendant was negligent. 
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POINT II. 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PREP-
ARATION OF THE TRIAL OF THE ·CASE. 
The duty of an attorney toward his client is stated 
in 45 ALR 2d, 5, at page 11 as follows : 
"While occasionally language may be found, 
especially in the earlier cases, suggesting that an 
attorney is liable to his client for the conduct of 
litigation only where he is chargeable with gross 
negligence or want of skill, it appears to be the 
presently well-settled rule in most if not all of the 
American jurisdictions in which the question has 
arisen that an attorney to whom the conduct of 
litigation is entrusted may be held liable to his 
client for dmnages resulting from his failure to 
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence, or, as it 
is frequently expressed, that degree of care, skill 
and diligence which is commonly possessed and 
exercised by attorneys in practice in the juris-
diction.'' 
It is the contention of plaintiff that defendant failed 
to exercise the reasonable skill and diligence of an attor-
ney in his relationship with plaintiff, and this matter 
presents a genuine issue of fact. Plaintiff further con-
tends that the record now before this Court substantiates 
this position. 
Plaintiff alleged in the third paragraph of the First 
Cause of Action of the Complaint that defendant was un-
skillful and negligent in the conduct of the case. This 
allegation of negligence places in issue the entire con-
duct of defendant Backman in advising, preparing and 
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conducting the trial of the case he was employed to de-
fend. The defendant did not file an answer to the Com-
plaint. We submit that without this pleading the issues 
raised by the allegations in the complaint are still present 
and are genuine issues of fact. 
Even though the defendant failed to deny the allega-
tions of the Complaint, the averments by defendant in his 
affidavit present genuine issues of fact. 
The affidavit defendant filed in support of his mo-
tion for summary judgment presented to the court an 
outline of his actions as an attorney in advising plain-
tiff, in preparing the defense of the case, and included 
an incomplete statement concerning the background of 
the title to the property involved. The affidavit of de-
fendant is completely without any assertion by him that 
before advising plaintiff or preparing the defense of the 
quiet title action he examined the records and files in his 
own office pertaining to the estate of Ernest J. Herridge. 
It is the contention of plaintiff that this failure of defend-
ant to examine the files of his office presents a genuine 
issue of fact fron1 which reasonable minds may conclude 
that he was negligent. 
We sub1nit that this contention is logically sound. 
If defendant had exmnined the files in his office his 
me1nory would have been refreshed and he would have 
known that the asserted clailn by the heirs of Ernest J. 
}{erridge 1nust naturally be based upon the Decree of 
Distribution entered in his estate. Defendant's recollec-
tion would haYe been refreshed and he would have lmown 
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that he had erroneously included the property involved 
in the controversy in the estate of Ernest J. Herridge 
;wtl that the deed fron1 plaintiff's mother did not convey 
a fee simple title to the property. With this valuabk 
information defendant could have attempted to rectify 
his mistake and if this were impossible he would have 
been in a position to advise plaintiff herein that the 
n~serted claiu1s were valid and unimpeachable and that 
it was in1possible for him to e1iminate their interest in 
the property. 
Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and 
diligence and advised plaintiff herein that the asserted 
claims by the heirs were unfounded and she was the sole 
and exclusive owner of the property by virtue of the 
warranty deed from her mother. 
This matter is material because evidence will be 
introduced that the heirs approached plaintiff for a 
settlement of their claims. The evidence will be that the 
heirs were willing to accept as settlement of their case 
the sun1 of $1,000.00 each and in consideration of this 
payment ·would convey their interests in the property 
to plaintiff. Evidence will also be introduced that de-
fendant was aware of this offer and advised plaintiff not 
to make any settlement. 
Plaintiff submits that by not settling the case for 
the sum of $3,000.00 she did not obtain the two-thirds 
interest in the home which had a value of $5,200.00. 
Plaintiff further submits that a judgment in the sum of 
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$1,026.7 4 was assessed against her one-third interest for 
rent which resulted in her being damaged in a total 
amount of approximately $3,226.74. 
The failure of defendant to use ordinary skill and 
diligence in appraising himself of the basis of the assert-
ed claims against his clients property, prevented him 
from discovering that the decree of distribution in the 
Ernest J. Herridge estate was not in accordance with 
the provisions of his will. Evidence will be introduced 
that the joint will of Mr. and Mrs. Herridge recited that 
each had invested 1noney in the purchase of the real prop-
erty then in their possession and that each owned a one-
half interest in said property. The will then recited that 
the distribution of the one-half interest of the de-
ceased would be one-third to the surviving spouse and 
two-thirds to the surviving children. The decree of dis-
tribution did not make this distinction and we submit 
this matter could have been modified prior to the quiet 
title action. This would not have altered the judgment 
rendered in the quiet title action, but ·would have assured 
that plaintiff would have reeeiYed a greater interest in 
the property. 
The affidavit of defendant states that his theory 
of the defense to the quiet title action was developed 
in good faith and an honest belief that his theory \n1s 
well founded. The affidavit further avers that he re-
sorted to the onl~r defense that was open to hun or would 
have been open to any well inforn1ed h1\\·yer. Plaii1tiff 
respertfull:· sub1nits that the faiure of defendant to fully 
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appraise himself of the basis of the alleged claim to a 
two-thirds interest in his client's property makes this 
a genuine issue of fact. 
Plaintiff submits that the matters presented herein 
establish there is a genuine issue of fact in this case 
and reasonable 1ninds could find that defendant Back-
man did not use reasonable skill and diligence in the de-
fense of this case. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING 
TO APPEAL THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF. 
The second cause of action is based upon the theory 
that defendant was negligent in failing to perfect an 
appeal from the judgment to the Supreme ·Court of the 
State of Utah. The allegations place in issue the actions 
of defendant after the trial of the case. 
The affidavit of defendant avers he ·withdrew as 
counsel for plaintiff on December 1, 1954, which was in 
ample time for her to secure other counsel. We submit 
that a genuine issue of fact is presented in that the record 
now before this Court establishes that this withdrawal 
was not filed with the Clerk of the Court until the 24th 
day of January, 1955, when the time for filing a notice 
of appeal had expired. The record discloses that while 
the affidavit of defendant avers the withdrawal on De-
cember 1, 1954, defendant filed a motion for new trial 
dated Decmnber 3, 1954. 
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Plaintiff contends the date of withdrawal is material 
because if an appeal could have been perfected in time 
the judgment entered by the court would have· been re-
versed. Plaintiff contends that the finding by the trial 
court that plaintiff herein should be assessed rent from 
February 1, 1953, ·was reversible error. The trial court 
committed reversible error in failing to find that plain-
tiff was entitled to credit for taxes and in1provements 
made on the property. 
We respectfully submit that this conduct of defend-
ant presents a genuine issue of fact as to whether he 
exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. 
CONCL"CSION 
We respectfully submit that the smnmary judgment 
of dis1nissal should be reversed and the case remanded 
to the trial court in order that the parties may present 
fully the evidence from live witnesses on the stand to a 
tribunal that may then determine the factual issues in-
volved and render a verdict and judg1nent based upon 
that determination. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
RICIL\RD c. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City. lTtah 
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